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DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLANS:
QUALIFYING FOR NON-QUALIFIED TREATMENT
JAMES F. NEAL*
I. INTRODUCTION

For an important number of people in our "affluent society," the
problem of spreading large current earnings, and the federal income
tax imposed thereon, over a number of years has taken on sizeable
proportions. Only slightly helpful for some of these people are the
deferred compensation provisions of sections 401 through 404 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the Code).'
Consequently, many highly paid executives must still resort to other
arrangements. The purpose of this paper is to explore the present
status, from an income tax standpoint, of those non-qualified arrangements between employers and employees which have as their object
the deferring of compensation for current services. Much has been
written on this subject,2 but recent developments involving both
funded and unfunded plans, as well as the increasing use of the latter,
seem to make worthwhile a review of the current status of the law
in this area in the light provided by its history.
To set the stage, qualified deferred compensation plans under
section 401 of the Code, including the requirements for qualification
and the tax consequences of the plans so qualified, will be discussed
briefly.
II. QUALIFIED PLANS

Even prior to the 1942 amendment of the Internal Revenue Code of
1939, certain deferred compensation plans received preferred treatment. In the 1942 amendment, however, the statute was made much
more explicit and considerably more restrictive. 3 Sections 401 to 404 of
the Code of 1954 now contain the provisions relating to qualification
for preferred treatment and the tax treatment once qualified. Section
401, the basic section; provides in essence that a pension, stock bonus
or profit sharing plan of an employer to qualify must cover either a
* Associate, Turney & Turney, Washington, D.C.; former Editor-in-Chief,
Vanderbilt Law Review.
1. Because of their stringent requirements the qualified pension, stock
bonus and profit sharing plans of §§ 401-04 may not prove suitable to the
highly paid executive. See TARLEAU, The Problem of Compensating Executives, PRoc. oF THE TAX INSTITUTE OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 149 (1953).

2. For a bibliography of articles in this field, see Fillman, Ford Motor Com-

pany Employee Benefit Plans, N.Y.U.

17TH INST.

See also Tax Notes, 45 A.B.A.J. 1204 (Nov. 1959).

ON FED. TAX 883, 893 (1959).

3. ALI BAsIc PENSION AND PROFIT SHARING PLANS, 2 (1957).
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definite percentage of employees 4 or such employees as are included
in a classification set up by the employer and found by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue not to be discriminatory in favor of officers,
supervisors or stockholder-employees; 5 must require that employer
contributions pursuant to the plan and income earned from those contributions be for the exclusive benefit of the employees or their beneficiaries; 6 and must not discriminate in allocation of contributions or
benefits in favor of officers, supervisors or employee-stockholders. 7 In
addition to these statutory requirements for qualifications, the Internal Revenue Service has added other requirements by use of the

word "plan." 8
Trusteed plans meeting the requirements of section 401 have three
primary tax benefits: the contributions of the employer are deductible
in the year paid to the trustee; 9 the income from the trust is exempt
from taxation; 0 and, generally, the beneficiaries are not taxed until
distribution is made from the trust.' Qualified annuity plans have
available two of the three benefits above, i.e., deduction by employer
of the amount of contribution in the year made and deferment of
tax to beneficiaries until distribution. 12 Additional benefits are bestowed upon beneficiaries of qualified plans when distribution is made,
such as exclusion from estate tax (section 2039 (c)) and tax at capital
gain rates where total distributions payable are paid within one taxable year to the beneficiary, by reason of the employee's death or
other separation from service. 13
4. Seventy per cent of all employees, or if seventy per cent or more of all
employees are eligible to benefit, then eighty per cent of that seventy per
cent. IxT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 401(a) (3) (A). As explained fully in the
regulations, to determine the percentages above, the employer may exclude
new employees, part time and seasonal employees. Thus, an employer may
employ one hundred people but coverage of fifty of these may satisfy the
seventy per cent rule if thirty of the employees are employed on a part time
or seasonal basis.
5. INT.REV. CODE OF 1954, § 401 (a) (3) (B).
6. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 401 (a) (2). Note that this section implies that
some part of the contribution or the income therefrom may revert to the
employer after satisfaction of all liabilities. The regulations explain this by
saying that only amounts left over because of erroneous actuarial computations may be returned to the employer and that the trust instrument must
contain a definite provision to this effect. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-2(b) (2) (1956).
7. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 401 (a) (4).
8. "Plan," says the Revenue Service, implies permanency and a written
program communicated to the employees.
9. Generally, whether or not the employer uses the accrual basis of accounting. The contributions of the employer are deductible under § 404 and
subject to the amount limitation thereof. They must not be unreasonable in
amount, however, when collated with other deductible compensation to the
individual employee beneficiaries paid under § 162.
10. INT.REV. CODE OF 1954, § 501 (a).
11. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 402 (a).
12. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 404 (a) (2), 403 (a).
13. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 402(a) (2) and 403(a) (2). For an analysis of
the tax consequences upon distribution from qualified plans and a criticism
of some of the special benefits, see Sporn, Taxation of Deferred Compensa-
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III. NoN-QuALIFim PLANS

As indicated in the introduction, the main thrust of this paper is
directed generally to those funded "plans" which fail to qualify under
section 401 or 403 and specifically to those "plans" which are not
completely covered anywhere within the sections 401 through 404
simply because they are unfunded.
A. Funded Contracts
1. Pre-1942.-Priorto 1942, there were no specific statutory provisions taxing employee-beneficiaries, using the cash and disbursements
method of accounting, on the contributions made by an employer pursuant to a contract deferring compensation. 14 The Revenue Service
and the courts in certain instances, however, had reached the results
later to be codified in the 1942 amendment to the Internal Revenue
Code of 1939.15 If the employee's rights under the funded contract were
nonforfeitable in the years in which the contributions were made,
the employee was taxed upon this amount in those years, notwith16
standing the fact that he would receive no cash for several years.
In reaching this result, the courts sometimes used the constructive
18
receipt doctrine,' 7 but more often the economic benefit theory.
In the leading case of Renton K. Brodie,19 the employer set aside
funds in 1934 to compensate employees for loyal service, but at this
time the fund was no more than a bookkeeping entry and the employees had no rights whatever therein. In 1938, however, the
employer took $25,000 out of the fund to purchase an annuity contract
for petitioner, vesting all rights under the contract in petitioner in
that year. In upholding the assessment upon petitioner for the tax
tion Arrangements, 14 TAx L. REV. 289, 299 (1959).
14. See SENATE FINANCE COMM., 77TH CONG., 2D SESS., S. REP. No. 1631 (1942).
15. Ibid.
16. Ward v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1947); Hackett v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d 121 (1st Cir. 1946); Hubbell v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d
516 (6th Cir. 1945); Oberwinder v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 255 (8th Cir.
1945); Renton K. Brodie, 1 T.C. 275 (1942); David Watson Anderson, 5 T.C.
1317 (1945); Paul A. Draper, 6 T.C. 209 (1946); Harold G. Perkins, 8 T.C. 1051
(1947).
17. "A taxpayer may not deliberately turn his back upon income and thus
select the year for which he will report it." Hamilton National Bank of
Chattanooga, 29 B.T.A. 63 (1933). The constructive receipt doctrine could
be used where the employee could have had cash but asked the employer to
obtain an annuity for him instead, Richard R. Deupree, 1 T.C. 113 (1942), or
where the employee controlled the corporate employer and had it purchase
an annuity instead of paying him cash for past services. Oberwinder v.
Commissioner, 147 F.2d 255 (8th Cir. 1945), could have been decided under
this doctrine.
18. The theory that compensation to be taxable need only be the equivalent of cash. Dudley T. Humphrey, 32 B.T.A. 280 (1935). As will be seen
infra, it may be illogical to say that one promise to pay is equivalent of cash,
but another equally safe is not.
19. 1 T.C. 275 (1942).
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on $25,000 in 1938, the court stated that petitioner had received the
"economic benefit" of the money expended in his behalf and was
therefore taxable.
Generally, if the employee's rights were nonforfeitable in the year
of the contribution, it made no difference that those rights had no
cash surrender or loan value or were nonassignable; 20 but at least in
one case taxability of the beneficiary in the year of contribution was
held to turn upon the question of whether the rights were assignable
in that year. This was the case of Ward v. Commissioner,21 in which
the court, finally deciding that the nonforfeitable rights were assignable in the year of the contribution, held that the employee-beneficiary was taxable on that amount in that year on the theory that he
had received the equivalent of cash.
It appears that in one important aspect the pre-1942 law on taxability of beneficiaries of nonforfeitable rights differed from the law
thereafter. In K. R. Kingsbury22 employees' rights in a non-qualified
trust had been forfeitable when the employer contributions had been
made, and thus not taxable, but became nonforfeitable in 1926 giving
them a life estate with a limited testamentary power of appointment.
In 1927 the trust was terminated and the employees received the
corpus. The court held that the employees were taxable in 1926 upon
the present value of the life estate and the limited power of appointment, and in 1927, upon the difference in value between those two
items and the value of the corpus. It is to be noted that the House
version of the 1942 amendment to section 165 (b) (now 402 (b)) and
section 22 (b) (2) (B) (now 403 (b)) incorporated the principle of the
Kingsbury case and, if passed, would have made beneficiaries of
funded contracts taxable on the employer contributions in the year
23
the erstwhile forfeitable rights became nonforfeitable.
On the employer's side, the pre-1942 law differed materially from
what it is today. The contributions of the employer were deductible
in the year made if they qualified as ordinary and necessary business
expenses and if the amount contributed could not revert back to the
employer, whether or not the rights of each individual employee were
nonforfeitable. 24
2. Post-1942.-In 1942 Congress amended section 165 (c) (now section 402 (b)) and section 22 (b) (2) (B) (now 403 (b)) to provide that
20. See, e.g., Hackett v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d 121 (1st Cir. 1956).

21. 159 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1947).
22. 31 B.T.A. 1126 (1935).
23. See note 14 supra.
24. Wesley Heat Treating Co., 30 T.C. 10 (1958); Gisholt Machine Co., 4
T.C. 699 (1945); Phillip H. Lord, 1 T.C. 286 (1942). The court, in Wesley Heat
Treating Co., did not discuss the method of determining if the amounts were
reasonable, and this would appear difficult if the rights could shift from one
employee to another.
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contributions by employers to non-exempt trusts and for non-qualified
annuities are taxable to employee-beneficiaries in the year of the
contributions if their rights are nonforfeitable in that year.25 Since
the statute provides that beneficiaries under non-exempt trusts and
non-qualified annuities are to be taxed under section 402 (b) and
403 (b) and since these sections provide for taxation in the year of
contribution only if the rights are nonforfeitable, it seems that the
employees would not be taxed upon contributions if their rights were
forfeitable during the year the contributions were made. This is the
position taken by the Service in the regulations, section 1.402 (b) -1 (a)
(2), and is undoubtedly the law unless changed by the case of Elliot
26
C. Morse.
In the Morse case the employer purchased an annuity contract for
petitioner in 1941. It was understood by all concerned that petitioner
was to receive the benefits under the contract when he retired, although the employer was the beneficiary and received the annual
annuity payment during 1942. Petitioner retired in 1943 and received
an assignment of the annuity contract. He reported as income in that
year only the amount received from the insurance company as an
annual payment and the Commissioner assessed a -deficiency. Petitioner argued that under section 403 (b) he was taxable on the
employer's contributions for the annuity only if in the year made
his rights were nonforfeitable and that since he did not have nonforfeitable rights in 1941 he was subject thereafter to a tax only upon the
distributions. In upholding the Commissioner the Tax Court made a
distinction between forfeitable rights and no rights and held that as
petitioner had no rights in the contract in 1941, the contribution by
the employer "for his benefit," within the meaning of section 403 (b)
occurred in 1943.
Except for possible difficulty in distinguishing, in every situation,
between no rights and forfeitable rights, there would appear to be
no inequity in the Morse case. Actually, the employer had done nothing more in 1941 than change the form of one of its own assets, i.e.,
from cash to an annuity. 27 The contribution, therefore, was an annuity
and occurred in 1943 when the employee's rights were nonforfeitable.
Presumably the employer would be allowed to deduct the contribution
in 1943 and thus, for this case, remove a real inequity which, as will
be discussed below, may exist in the law at present.
25. Section 402(b) for non-exempt trusts and
annuities.

§ 403(b) for non-qualified

26. 17 T.C. 1244 (1952), aff'd, 202 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1953). Of course they

would be taxed upon distribution of the proceeds.
27. Apparently some writers have sensed a danger to unfunded contracts
arising out of Morse. See Bergen, Income Tax Aspects of Non Qualified
Deferred Compensation Plans, N.Y.U. 16TH INsT. ON FED. TAX 91 (1958). See,
however, Casale v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1957).
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As stated elsewhere in this article, prior to the year 1942 employer

contributions to non-qualified deferred compensation plans were
deductible under the general provisions of section 23 (a) (now section
162) if they qualified as ordinary and necessary business expenses,
whether or not the rights of each individual employee were forfeitable
in the year of the contribution. Congress, in 1942, amended section
23 (p) to provide that employer contributions to non-qualified plans
are deductible only under this section and deductible in the year made
if the employee's rights were nonforfeitable during that year. Provisions containing identical language were carried over into sections
404 (a) and 404(a) (5) of the 1954 Code. Pursuant to these sections,
the regulations, section 1.404 (a) -12, state that if the employee's rights
are forfeitable when contributions are made no deduction can ever
be taken by the employer. Two important cases have arisen under
the corresponding provisions in the 1939 Code and the courts have
reached what seem to be diametrically opposite results. In Wesley
Heat Treating Co.'2 the employer set up an irrevocable trust in the
latter part of each year 1940 through 1946 and at the same time made
a contribution to the trust, the amount depending upon profits estimated for the year. The trust instruments provided generally that
payments from each trust were to be made to employees, if practical,
in the year following the establishment of the trust; but that in any
event all distributions were to be made and the trust terminated
within three years. The trustees were given discretion in apportioning the distributions among the employees. In most cases the payments were actually made over two or three years following the
institution of the trust. The court held that as to the trusts established
prior to January 1, 1942, the contributions were deductible under
section 23 (a) (now section 162) as ordinary and necessary business
expenses, but that as to the trusts established after that date no contributions were ever deductible since the individual rights of the
employees were forfeitable in the year of the contribution. In so
holding the court clearly passed upon the contention of the employer
that as to the post-1942 trusts it was at least entitled to a deduction
in the year of distribution.
The Court of Claims, in Russell Mfg. Co. v. United States,29 held
that the employer was not entitled to take a deduction for contributions to a non-qualified irrevocable trust in the year the contributions
were made since the individual employee's rights were forfeitable in
that year,30 but that in the subsequent year, when the distribution of
28. 30 T.C. 10 (1958), af'd, 267 F.2d 853 (7th Cir. 1959).
29. 175 F.Supp. 159 (Ct. Cl. 1959),

nonacq. Rev. Rul. 59-383, 1959-1 CuM.

BULL. 30.
30. It was established in William M. Bailey, 15 T.C. 468 (1950), aff'd, 192
F.2d 574 (3d Cir. 1951), that provision concerning nonforfeitability referred
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the prior year's contribution was made, the employer was entitled to
a deduction. The court stated that the legislative history of sections
23(p) (1) and 23 (p) (1) (D) of the 1939 Code indicated a congressional intent to grant tax benefits to qualified plans but not to penalize
unqualified plans, and that the clear language of these sections 3'
provided that deduction may be taken in the year the contribution
is made if the employee's rights are nonforfeitable or, if not, in the
year the compensation is paid to the beneficiaries. In passing, the
court stated, without giving reasons, that the Wesley case was distinguishable.
It is hard to see the clarity in these sections that impressed the
court, and it seems that the court treated too cavalierly the argument
of the Commissioner relating to the failure of Congress to pass a
proposal which would have permitted a deduction in the year distributions were made to the beneficiaries. Nevertheless, except for the
conceptual problem of allowing one entity a deduction for a payment
made by another, particularly an irrevocable trust, it is difficult to
argue with the essential fairness of the result reached in the Russell
case. It was obviously Congress' intention to encourage the use of
qualified plans by granting tax benefits not enjoyable under general
tax principles. It seems unduly harsh, however, to penalize nonqualified plans by never allowing employers a deduction for ordinary and necessary salaries paid to employees. Furthermore, the
language of sections 23(p) (1) and 23(p) (1) (d) of the 1939 Code
is sufficiently ambiguous to permit the result reached by the court
without it being guilty of judicial legislation. The rule of the Russell
case brings the law more nearly in line with that existing prior to
1942 and seems to be altogether a desirable result. Of course, an
employer would not be well advised at the present time to rely upon
the Russell case as the Service has indicated its intention not to follow that decision.
B. Unfunded Contracts
One could conceive of numerous situations which would be covered
under this subject. The contract may be to pay in later years for
to individual rights and not to the rights of a group.
31. Identical language in sections 404(a) and 404(a) (5) provides:
"If contributions are paid.., to or under a stock bonus, profit-sharing or
annuity plan, or if compensation is paid.., on account of any employee
under a plan deferring the receipt of such compensation, such contributions or compensation shall ... be deductible under this section, subject,
however, to the following limitations as to the amounts deductible in
any year:
"(5) OTHER PLANS-In the taxable year when paid, if the plan is not
[qualified], if the employees' rights to or derived from such employer's
contribution or such compensation are nonforfeitable at the time the
contribution or compensation is paid."
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services already performed at the time the contract is executed; it
may be to pay over the next ten years for services performed in the
next two; or it may be to pay stated annual amounts after a future
32
retirement for a fixed number of years or for life. There are elements common to all, however; a eontract between persons having
generally the relationship of employer and employee deferring compensation beyond the termination of the services which gave rise to
the obligation to pay; and no current contributions by the employer
to a trust or for an annuity, in which the employee has a beneficial
interest, in order to fund the obligation.
The fundamental issues in each of these situations are whether the
employee receives taxable income prior to actual payment, and if so,
when. It should be emphasized again that sections 401 through 403
of the Code do not apply, and, indeed, there are no statutory provisions specifically applicable. Consequently, if cash basis taxpayers
are to be taxed prior to the receipt of cash, the Revenue Service must,
as it did prior to 1942 in the case of funded contracts, rely on the
doctrines of constructive receipt and economic benefit in connection
with the general provisions of section 61.
For a period of time the Internal Revenue Service fought a valiant
but losing fight to tax employees under these contracts prior to the
actual receipt of cash,3 but in recent years it has been ominously
inactive. It has been thought generally that the problem was being
reviewed at high levels and that there was increasing pressure from
the field offices for an announced policy. Around February 1 of this
year, the Service issued Revenue Ruling 60-31- in which it appears
to have capitulated to the taxpayers and the courts, at least within
the defined limits set out in the ruling. The significance of this apparently unexpected development can be appreciated only by a brief
review of the fight which proceeded it.
35
One of the early cases involving this subject was William J. Hines.
In that case, counsel were employed to settle an estate. Until the
end of the year 1933, they had no right to any compensation; and
prior to that time, a contract had been executed whereby the residuary legatee, a corporation, had agreed to pay the fee for their services
within the next five years. Actually, payment was made equally over
the next five years. In reversing the Commissioner's assessment of
a deficiency for 1933, the court held that, since prior to the end of
32. See Casale v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 1020 (1956), rev'd, 247 F.2d 440 (2d
Cir. 1957), for a typical contract.

33. James F. Oates, 18 T.C. 571 (1952), afd, 207 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1953);
Howard Veit, 8 T.C. 809 (1947); William E. Freeman, 4 T.C. 582 (1945); Kay
Kimbell, 41 B.T.A. 940 (1940); William J. Hines, 38 B.T.A. 1061 (1938).
34. Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960 INT. REV. BULL. No. 5, at 17.
35. 38 B.T.A. 1061 (1938).
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1933 counsel were entitled to no compensation and that by the end
of the year a binding contract prevented them from receiving it, the
doctrine of constructive receipt did not apply. The court also held,
apparently because the promise to pay was not easily transferable,
that counsel could not be taxed in 1933 on the theory that they had
received a taxable economic benefit in that year. It is to be noted
that by the end of 1933 there were no contingencies or conditions in
the way of counsel's ultimate receipt of the money.
It seemed apparent that the constructive receipt doctrine would be
ineffective in this area if it could be avoided simply by having the
employer and employee sign a binding contract deferring payment a
short period before the employee, under the original contract, would
be entitled to receive the money. In fact, the court in a later case
modified its position in this regard. In Howard Veit,3 where, again,
the right to receive payment was unconditional in the year in question, the court was careful to point out that the prior contract deferring this compensation was a bona fide arm's-length bargain beneficial to both parties and intended to accomplish purposes other than
the avoiding of taxes.
Application of the economic benefit theory was restricted in the
Hines case to those situations involving a promise which was easily
transferable. Three dissents in William E. Freeman37 argued that this
theory was not so restricted. In that case, the employer, in 1929, had
promised to pay petitioner $12,000 a year for life and $8,000 a year
to his widow for life if she survived him. The promise was said to
be in consideration for "past, present and future services." By court
order in 1939, the estate of the employer purchased annuities for
petitioner in settlement of the 1929 obligation. Petitioner did not
include the value of the annuities in his return for 1939, and argued
in the Tax Court that since he had received an economic benefit in
1929, he should have paid a tax in that year, but that in 1939 he had
only received one promise in lieu of another. In rejecting this argument, the court stated that in 1929 petitioner had received a "mere"
promise to pay conditioned upon his satisfactory performance in the
future. He was, therefore, taxable in 1939 upon the value of the annuities.
The three dissents, emphasizing that the rights under the 1929
promise became unconditional in 1930 when the employer died,
agreed with petitioner that in 1939 he had merely received one promise of lesser value in lieu of another, both from solvent obligors.
They would have reversed the Commissioner on the ground that the
36. 8 T.C. 809 (1947); Kay Kimbell, 41 B.T.A. 940 (1940).
37. 4 T.C. 582 (1945). See also Frederick John Wolfe, 8 T.C. 689 (1947),
af'd per curiam, 170 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1948).
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tax should have been imposed in an earlier year.
One of the most recent cases is the 1952 case of James F. Oates,38
in which insurance agents, electing to spread terminal commissions
evenly over several years instead of receiving them as they ordinarily
come, large in the first few years and declining thereafter, were assessed with a deficiency in the early years to the extent of the difference between the amount they actually received and the amount
they would have received without the election. The election had to
be made prior to retirement and was irrevocable once made. On
appeal to the Tax Court the Commissioner was reversed. The court,
citing Veit and Kimbell,39 held that the agents had not constructively
received the difference because the bona fide, binding contract, executed prior to the time the payments would have been due, placed
limitations upon the availability of the money. The court scarcely
considered the economic benefit theory, even though the agents' rights
could be considered unconditional, although the amount was not capable of precise determination.
The case of Casale v. Commissioner," while involving a question of
dividend income, is pertinent because of the facts involved and the
reasoning employed by the court. In that case, the corporation, 98%
of whose stock was owned by taxpayer-employee, entered into a
contract whereby the latter would continue to work for the corporation for a period of years, after which time he would receive a retirement pension provided that he did not compete, directly or indirectly,
with the corporation. The corporation then purchased an insurance
contract upon the life of the employee, retaining all incidents of
ownership. Upon retirement of the employee, however, the insurance
contract was to be converted automatically into an annuity, with
payments going directly to the employee. 41 The court of appeals,
reversing the Tax Court, held that the employee did not receive dividend income to the extent of the premiums paid by the corporation
during the years prior to his retirement, since he had no rights in
the contract. All he had was his contract with the employer under
which he might receive compensation in the future.
Notwithstanding the fact that aside from the Freeman case the
courts have not seemed to place too much importance upon forfeitability vis-a-vis nonforfeitabiity of rights under the contract, and
notwithstanding the intonations that the doctrine of constructive
38. 18 T.C. 571 (1952), aff'd, 207 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1953). The recent ruling,
Rev. Rul. 60-31, supra note 34, withdrew the prior non-acquiescence in this
case and stated that the Service would now acquiesce.
39. See note 33 supra.
40. 247 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1957), reversing Oreste Casale, 26 T.C. 1020 (1956).
41. However, if the employee competed with the corporation without its
consent, the annuity payments would have been diverted to the employer
since it still held the right to change the beneficiary.
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receipt is to be sparingly applied 42 and that.a mere promise to pay
an amount in the future is not the equivalent of cash,4 3 lawyers have
been careful to make the employees' rights inder these contracts
conditional as to each amount until the amount is actually received.
The conditions commonly imposed are that the employee is to remain
available for consultation and is not to compete with the employer.
Such was the state of apprehension and uncertainty prior to February
of this year.
In Revenue Ruling 60-31,44 the Service ruled upon five factual situations, all involving cash-basis taxpayers. The first two involved
contracts deferring compensation of employee-executives of the employer corporation. In both cases the contracts provided for stated
salaries during a period of employment, with deferred payments to
commence upon retirement or disability of the employee. Under both
contracts, annual amounts during the period of employment were to
be credited to accounts in the name of the employees and carried
on the books of the corporation as liabilities. The corporation in
neither case held the amounts as trustee for the employees, and the
employees' rights against the employer were correspondingly limited
to the contract. In the first situation, rights of the employees were
nonforfeitable; in the second, the rights were subject to the usual
conditions of remaining available for consultation and refraining
from competition with the employer.
In the third situation the taxpayer, an author, and the corporation,
a publishing company, executed two contracts simultaneously, the
effect of which was to grant the corporation exclusive publishing
rights to the author's book for a stated royalty, which was to be a
percentage of the proceeds received by the publisher from the sales
of the book. While the first contract provided for semi-annual payments, the second required the publisher to hold the excess over a
stated annual amount and carry it forward to a subsequent accounting
period. The publisher was not required to segregate or pay interest
on the amount carried over.
In the fourth situation, the taxpayer was a professional football
player who had signed a contract to play with a club for two years
at a stated salary. In addition he was to be paid a bonus for signing
the contract. Under the contract this bonus was to be placed with an
escrow agent pursuant to an escrow agreement which provided that
the amount deposited was to be paid out to the player in equal
42. William J. Hines, 38 B.T.A. 1061 (1938); Cecil Q. Adams, 20 B.T.A.
243 (1930), aff'd, 54 F.2d 228 (1st Cir. 1931); John A. Brander, 3 B.T.A. 231
(1925).

43. United States v. Christine Oil & Gas Co., 269 Fed. 458 (W.D. La. 1920);
Dudley T. Humphrey, 32 B.T.A. 280 (1935); John B. Atkins, 9 B.T.A. 140
(1927).
44. Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960 INT. REv. BULL. No. 5, at 17.
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installments over a five-year period.
The last factual situation involved a boxer who had signed a contract with a boxing club, under which he was to participate in a
fight for a percentage of the proceeds. Under the contract, 25% of
the boxer's share was to be paid within three weeks of the fight and
25% was to be paid in each of the three years following the year in
which the fight was staged.
In the first three cases, the Service held that the taxpayers would
be subject to tax upon the deferred payments only in the year or
years in which they were received. The economic benefit, or equivalent of cash, theory was ruled inapplicable on the ground that mere
promises to pay were involved, not evidenced by notes or secured in
any way. Ruling that the taxpayers would not be held to have constructively received the deferred payments, the Service gave effect
to the contractual time limitations imposed by the parties themselves,
without regard to motives and without regard to the fact that in two
of the cases the money would be earned and completely vested prior
to actual receipt. By its reasoning that "the statute could not be
administered by speculation whether the payor would have been
willing to agree to an earlier payment," and by acquiescing in the
Oates case, the Service seems to be saying that for tax purposes it
will recognize and give effect to contracts postponing the payment of
income if executed prior to the time that the employee or independent
contractor is entitled to receive the money, even though it has been
earned at the time the contract is executed.
The Service distinguished the case of the football player and held
him taxable on the bonus when paid to the escrow agent upon the
sole ground that a fund had been physically segregated in which
he had a specific interest. Time limitations, similar to those in the
first three cases, having been imposed upon the player's receipt of the
money, the Service was forced to rely upon the economic benefit
theory. Applying this theory, it apparently reasoned that the removal
of a specific fund from the control of the employer, and the exigencies
of its business, bestowed upon the football player a benefit different
in kind from that received by the promisee of a "mere promise to
pay." As the escrow account was not a trust or an annuity, no direct
reliance was placed upon sections 402 (b) or 403 (b) of the Code.
Perhaps, in the case of a small business in an unstable industry or
a shoestring operator, making the segregation of a fund the pivotal
point of the case is valid. In the case of a large and prosperous corporation, however, the mere promise to pay would seem to be as
much of a benefit to the employee-taxpayer as a promise funded by
deposits with an escrow agent, and it is the benefit to the employee
which should govern and not the loss of control over the fund by the
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employer. The result may work a penalty upon executives of small
companies while leaving the way clear for the executives of the larger
companies to accomplish substantial tax savings.
In the case of the boxer, the Service ruled that he was taxable
upon the total amount of his share of the proceeds in the year in
which it was paid to the club. It reasoned that the boxer was not an
employee or independent contractor of the, club, but a partner or
joint venturer, and would, therefore, acquire ownership of his share
of the proceeds immediately. The contract between the boxer and
the club merely shifted possession of the fund for the three-year
period.
This ruling appears to be a definite boon to taxpayers desiring to
spread large current earnings over a number of years. If it does not
entirely clear the path, it at least points out the obstacles. If the
status of the contracting parties is that of employer-employee, or
client-independent contractor, the first important obstacle to avoid is
the physical segregation of a fund in which the employee is given a
specific interest. Next, in order to avoid the doctrine of constructive
receipt, the contract must be binding and be executed prior to the
time that the money would otherwise be available to the employee.
In a situation analogous to that of the boxer, it may be necessary to
execute something in the nature of a personal-service contract, providing clearly that the performer has no interest in the proceeds of
the venture other than his salary from the employer.
Perhaps still unclear under this ruling is the Casale type situation
in which the employer "funds" the obligation to the employee by the
purchase of an annuity in which it retains all of the rights of ownership. Will this be considered by the Service as a segregation of
assets, or merely a bookkeeping entry? Of course, other incidental
issues may arise, i.e., will the amount credited by the corporation to
the employee's account be considered necessary to meet the reasonable needs of the business within the meaning of section 531 of the
Code? Will the proceeds payable to the survivor be income in respect
of a decedent under section 691? How will the proceeds be taxed to
the secondary beneficiary in case they are payable in installments
after the death of the employee? All such issues are outside the scope
of this article, but, obviously, must be considered by the tax planner.
There has been little difficulty from the employer's standpoint in
these unfunded deferred compensation situations. Under section
404 (a) (5), as interpreted by the Regulations, section 1.404 (a) -12,
when and as payments are made to the employee, his rights are
nonforfeitable and the employer may take a deduction at that time.4 5
It is to be noted that since the payments are deductible under this
45. Rev. Rul. 60-31, supranote 44, expressly ruled upon this point.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 13

section, if they also meet the requirements of section 162, an accrualbasis taxpayer is treated exactly as one using the cash and disbursements method of accounting.
IV. CONCLUSION

With the promulgation of Revenue Ruling 60-31, one of the dark
corners in the area of deferred compensation was illuminated. Employers and employees may obtain commitments from the Service
that proposed pension, profit-sharing, or stock-bonus plans will qualify
for deferred treatment. Taxpayers, notwithstanding Russell Manufacturing Co.,46 can be reasonably certain of the Service's position as to
the tax consequences of nonqualified but funded programs. The recent
ruling now outlines a method whereby highly paid executives may
obtain substantial benefits not otherwise available to them.
The Service, in issuing Revenue Ruling 60-31, had to resolve a
conflict of basic tax concepts. On the one hand, taxation of promises
before payment would tend to obliterate the fundamental distinction
between cash- and accrual-basis taxpayers; on the other, the failure
to tax such promises would undermine to some extent the policy of
progressive taxation and impair the usefulness of, and incentive for,
qualified plans. It is the opinion of the writer that either resolution of
this conflict would have been difficult to criticize. The resolution
adopted, however, should weaken the Treasury Department's opposition to H.R. 10, the so-called Jenkins-Keogh bill, which proposes to
extend the tax benefits of deferred compensation to self-employed
persons.
46. 59 U.S. Tax Cas. [ 9582 (Ct. C1. 1959).

